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ABSTRACT
MEMORY FOR EVENTS DURING EARLY CHILDHOOD
TWO TO FOUR YEARS LATER
SEPTEMBER 1993
CINDY J. SPEAKER, A. A. , SIMON'S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD
B.A., SIMON'S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nancy A. Myers
Perris (1989) taught 10-month-old infants in a unique
environment to operate a specially designed toy in an event
repeated four times. These infants were tested at 14 months
as were age-matched controls. A first follow-up study was
conducted at 32 months in which a subset of the original
experimental and control subjects participated as did new
control subjects. The present follow-up at 60 months
evaluated the performance of six groups of children who
differed in amount and timing of previous experience. Two
groups of children had participated in the first follow-up in
addition to having infant experience, two groups had only
infant experience, one group had only the 3 2-month experience,
and the last group had no previous experience. Children's
memory for the target event was assessed. Experienced
children demonstrated that they possessed memories of the
earlier experience ( s) . Although memory was neither complete
nor expressed in the same manner by all children, experienced
children performed differently than inexperienced peers on a
vi
number of behavioral and verbal measures. Not only did
experienced children take less time to make their target
response, they also were more likely to do so before a
demonstration. In addition, only experienced children showed
spontaneous responding during a free play segment. Three
experienced children gave verbal recall or recognition of the
infant event. A cumulative memory index showed interesting
differences between experienced groups. Results are discussed
in light of theoretical predictions concerning the effects of
context, experience level, and interference on memory. The
relevance of the results to theories of early memory is also
considered.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When we think back to our earliest memory, most of us
recall an event that occurred at around the age of 3. Why is
this? Is it because we actually have no memory of events
earlier than that time? Is it because we are unable for one
reason or another to retrieve existing memories of events
occurring before the age of 3? Is it because of the intensity
of the event we claim as our first memory and its relevance in
our lives? Is it because it may have been a repeated event?
Is it because infants have no memorial capabilities and it is
only at the age of two to three years that one's memory begins
to function? Are the memories there but we are not able to
retrieve them because they are not in the form we expect or
one we recognize? There are many questions surrounding the
issue of early memory and its long-term duration. The purpose
here is to explore the literature in search of some answers
and to discuss the results of the present study in hopes of
shedding some additional light onto our understanding of early
memory.
Theories of Early Memory
The phenomena of adults being unable to recall early
autobiographic events has been termed infantile or childhood
amnesia. In Pillemer and White's (1989) review of the
1
literature on this phenomena, they found that theories of
infantile amnesia fall into one of three explanatory
categories ~ repression, cognitive limitations, or social
circumstances
.
The belief that infantile amnesia is due to repression as
an adult is attributed to Freud's psychoanalytic theory.
Pillemer and White discuss two views put forth by Freud. One,
the blockade model, says that the childhood memories are there
and fully formed, however, they are behind a wall of
repression, so to speak, and as adults we are unable to access
them. According to Freud, this repression is the result of
the conflicts involved with infantile sexuality. Freud's less
extreme view which he advocated later in his career is a
selective reconstruction model. This model proposes that
children do not form fully detailed memories. Rather the
memories have missing parts and only fragments exist.
Reconstruction of these memories is extremely difficult and
often leads to misleading memories. Consequently , both of
these Freudian models more or less state that early memories
are irretrievable by the adult.
The second explanatory view is that infantile amnesia
exists due to the cognitive inabilities of children. This
view generally involves the child being cognitively unable to
process information in such a way that facilitates long-term
retention. It is seen as an encoding deficit on the part of
2
the child more than a retrieval deficit on the part of the
adult or older child.
For Piaget, who is most widely associated with the
exploration of the cognitive development of children, memories
require cognitive capabilities such as judgments, logical
relations, etc. as memory is very much a (re) constructive
process. According to his theory of cognitive development
these abilities are not possible until the concrete
operational period. Thus, it is not so surprising that we do
not remember before the age of 3. Before this stage, the
child is in a stage dominated by sensory influences. Although
in the intuitive stage of the preoperational period (ages 4-
7) , memories for isolated events are possible, it is only
during the concrete operational stage (ages 7-12) that the
necessary connections are made to have an understanding of
chronology and meaning can be attributed to events. According
to Piaget, the development of memory can be traced in
accordance with the development of structures which allow
better organization of past and present experiences (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1973). The increasing capability of the child
in using processes such as accommodation and assimilation
allow for better memory. This mnemonic process development
may be considered continuous in the sense that the emergence
of recognition, reconstruction, and recall abilities occur in
an ordered sequence. The development of memory is also tied
to the development of intelligence by means of the mnemonic
3
devices that are employed. It appears then that for Piaget,
memory is immensely connected to representational capabilities
(especially language) which he believes emerge at the end of
the sensorimotor period.
Mandler (1988, 1992), on the other hand, proposes that
there exists an accessible conceptual system which develops
simultaneously with the sensorimotor system, allowing infants
to encode by a process of perceptual analysis. She defines
this process as the conscious active comparison of one
perception to another, or as paying close attention and
examining one or more stimuli. This process results in
redescriptions of spatial structure into the form of image-
schemas which include relational features. It is these
redescriptions that Mandler claims constitute the accessible
meanings that infants use to create concepts.
This mechanism differs from that of Piaget 's sensorimotor
functioning in several ways. First, Mandler asserts that
infants are born with the capacity to engage in perceptual
analysis. Mandler admits that it is a primitive system at
first; one that develops just as the sensorimotor system
develops. In contrast, Piaget' s theory does not allow for
perceptual comparisons before the age of two years.
Second, Piaget suggests that only after sensorimotor
development permits the emergence of representative skill and
subsequent language, does the child engage in thinking.
Mandler, however, does not require the infant to have
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linguistic skills in order to be capable of representational
thought. She believes that infants have representations but
are not able to verbally communicate them. Related to
language is the issue of symbolic functioning. This
capability, for Piaget, emerges at the same time as language
which then leads to the emergence of recall and imitation.
For Mandler, this system is the "vehicle of thought" and is
present much earlier than two years of age. Recall by
Mandler' s definition is a conscious product of bringing into
awareness information regarding a specific item or event
(Mandler, 1990b) . She sees two requirements for recall.
First, information must be encoded in a conceptual format.
Second, information must have been consciously attended to or
noticed.
In reviewing the literature in support of her position,
Mandler cites work by Baillargeon (1991) which suggests that
infants are capable of object permanence, and thus
representational thought, at 3 months of age, rather than at
Piaget' s account of 9 months. She also reinterprets some of
Piaget 's own imitation data in light of her theory, as
evidence for early representation.
Pillemer and White also note that there is some evidence
that suggests that changes in cognitive capabilities are
related to neurophysiological changes. That is, changes in the
brain itself, as well as hormonal changes, are tied to
cognitive abilities. Howe and Courage (1993) in a recent
review of this literature concluded as well, that although the
memory system of infants operates at a greater level than once
believed (as the basic hardware is in place at birth for
perception, learning, and memory) , the system continues to
mature during the first two postnatal years and is constrained
by neurophysiological changes. In particular, three changes
have been implicated. First, there is immaturity of the
hippocampal region of the infant's forebrain. Researchers
have connected the hippocampal region with the distinction
between procedural and declarative memory. Although
procedural memory can operate with an immature or damaged
hippocampal region, declarative memory cannot. Second, there
is immaturity of the infant's prefrontal cortex. The
development between 8 and 24 months of age of this region has
been found to facilitate ability for cognitive tasks. Third,
the rate of synaptic efficiency has been found to improve
during infancy and may well underlie memory and learning
changes.
One other possibly important set of cognitive
explanations are focused on resource limitation and/or the
existence of deficiencies in storage capacities and processing
capabilities of children. Pascual-Leone ' s model of cognition,
as cited by White and Pillemer (1979), contains a set of
metaconstructs with operators that activate mental schemes.
M-space is the central computing space, which determines how
much can be activated simultaneously using voluntary
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attention. The size of M-space increases with age. For the
first two years of life, the child is equipped only with an
amount denoted as "e" that is the space occupied by the
executive schemes that direct the operators. The space is
then built up one scheme or unit every two years.
Consequently, working memory is a limited resource, as once
the space is utilized no further processing can be completed.
Case, Kurland, and Goldberg (1982) on the other hand sees M-
space as a fixed amount of total processing space set from
birth. The capabilities of this total operating space is
affected by how much space the operations take up. Thus,
space can become available once proficiency is attained.
Consequently, strategies can increase operational efficiency
which would then lead to greater M-space availability.
The last set of explanations for infantile amnesia as
seen by Pillemer and White relate to socially induced changes.
Viewpoints included here range from those emphasizing that the
categories of adult memory do not allow childhood memories to
be categorized (Schachtel's view) to those suggesting that the
unlikelihood of reinstating the total context makes retrieval
of early memories difficult (Rovee-Collier 1 s view, which will
be discussed in depth in the section on reminders) . According
to Schachtel (1947), it is not that experiences during the
early years of life are not in memory but that the adult
"mode" of experience is so radically different that it causes
retrieval incapability.
7
Pillemer and White propose a dual memory system to
explain the existence of infantile amnesia. They suggest two
components; a primitive system that is present at birth and
operational throughout one's life as well as a social system
that emerges during the preschool years. The primitive system
responds to situational and affective cues. Memories are
expressed through "images, behaviors, or emotions" (1989, p.
326)
.
In the social system, memories can be intentionally
retrieved and verbalized to others, thus mediating the
emergence of the capability of autobiographical memory. The
key difference between the two is language. Pillemer and
White seem to place greater importance on the second system.
Is this really appropriate? Is the ability to communicate
one 1 s memory the ultimate determination of its value or its
existence?
Nelson (1993) also views the absence of language and a
social component as reasons for infantile amnesia. She
distinguishes between three types of memories. These are: (1)
generic event memory which is more or less a general outline,
containing no details; (2) episodic memory which refers to
something that happened once at a specific time and place; and
(3) autobiographical memory which is a subset of episodic
memory referring to specific, personal events that are long-
lasting and of significance to the self system. Her view is
that infantile amnesia arises not because something is lost
but rather because the ability to have autobiographical
8
memories develops. Children develop this ability according to
Nelson by social interactions in which they learn the forms of
how to talk about memories with others and thus learn how to
actually formulate their memories as narratives (which is a
retrievable form). Similar to Pillemer and White's position
that the social system (of their dual memory system) exists so
that memories can be intentionally retrieved and verbalized to
others, Nelson believes that the function of autobiographical
memory is to share memories with other people. Her
theoretical claim is that "language opens up the possibilities
for sharing and retaining memories in a culturally share
format for both personal and social functions" (Nelson, 1993,
p. 12).
Howe and Courage (1993) in a recent review article on
infantile amnesia advocate a different approach to
understanding the phenomenon. They view the term amnesia as
"somewhat of a misnomer" (p. 306) in that it is not the
fundamental processes involved in memory that are the source
of later failures to recall early childhood events. The
offset of infantile amnesia is not a function of changes in
memory mechanisms per se but rather is related to changes in
other areas of cognitive functioning. Specifically, according
to Howe and Courage, the key to understanding infantile
amnesia is the developing sense of self (not the development
of language or a secondary memory system) . That is,
"infantile amnesia devolves as knowledge of the self evolves"
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(Howe and Courage, 1993, p. 306). A sense of self is
necessary in order to structure autobiographical memory,
defined by Howe and Courage as the memory for information and
events pertaining to self. Consequently, they argue that
events occurring before the development of an independent
sense of self, which occurs about 18 months of age, cannot be
organized as autobiographical memory but rather are organized
as generalized learning experiences. This occurs because
there is no referent around which personally experienced
events can be organized.
One strength of this position is that it can account for
the individual differences which exist in reports of the
offset of infantile amnesia. It is well documented that there
are individual differences in the development of self concepts
(including self-recognition which is one facet of self
concept) . Therefore, one would expect differences in the
timing of the "earliest" memories of individuals since it is
contingent upon the development of a sense of self.
In interpreting Howe and Courage's position, Leichtman
and Ceci (1992) deduce that events that do not fit the
autobiographical constraints of Howe and Courage (such as
conditioning studies that depend only on the temporal
contiguity between a stimulus and the child's physical
response) will be remembered better than events that are tied
to personally meaningful experiences as the latter require an
10
awareness of one's own self as the recipient of the experience
located in space and time.
Leichtman and Ceci define infantile amnesia as the
inability at any age to retrieve memories of events that
occurred during the first few years of life. They provide an
interesting interpretation using fuzzy-trace theory. Fuzzy-
trace theory developed by Brainerd and Reyna (1990) is a gist-
driven theory of cognitive development set forth as an
alternative to Piagetian and information-processing
perspectives
.
There are seven general principles regarding encoding,
storage, and retrieval included in fuzzy-trace theory, each of
which will be briefly described. First, there is gist
extraction. The premise is that during encoding, information
is reduced to its essence. Second, fuzzy-to-verbatim continua
exist which are, on the one end, defined by fuzzy (gist-like)
traces and on the other by verbatim (veridical) traces. The
continua permit encoding of verbatim and fuzzy traces at the
same time, and also permit them to function independently.
This allows for maximization of performance as the multiple
traces varying in degrees of specificity and consequently in
ease of retrieval provide cognitive flexibility. Third, there
is a preference for fuzzy processing. This preference arises
from the disadvantages of verbatim traces. Verbatim traces
disintegrate faster, have a narrow range of effective
retrieval cues, and are less manipulable than fuzzy traces;
11
all of which affect their availability and accessibility.
Fourth, short-term as well as long-term memory is
reconstructive in nature. Unlike other theories, fuzzy-trace
theory does not hold short-term memory to be a verbatim system
only. Rather, like long-term memory, short-term memory
contains both fuzzy and verbatim traces and which ones are
relied upon depends on the particular task considerations.
Fifth, there is output interference. That is, retrieval
itself produces interference for later retrieval by increasing
the amount of irrelevant information. Sixth, unlike other
theories which posit a common processing resource, fuzzy-trace
theory does not include a generic capacity variable. Thus,
there is resource freedom. And finally, there is an overall
ontogenetic assumption. The first five principles described
above have a fundamental developmental nature. During
development, there are varying abilities to extract and encode
gist as well as different preferences and susceptibilities.
Overall, fuzzy-trace theory grants that memory holds
multiple traces of events varying as to their verbatim or gist
nature. In some respects, this notion is quite compatible
with the multiple encoding system set forth by Johnson (1983)
.
Her model, which she calls MEM (multiple-entry, modular memory
system)
,
proposes that there are three subsystems (sensory,
perceptual, and reflection) which respond to different aspects
of an experience and thus for any one experience there are
likely to be multiple entries.
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In Leichtman and Ceci's discussion of infantile amnesia
via fuzzy-trace theory, only the first three of the seven
principles (gist extraction, fuzzy-to-verbatim continua, and
fuzzy-processing preference) are emphasized. They argue that
gist-like representations have been found to be used
infrequently by younger children. The ability to encode in a
fuzzy or gist-like manner improves with age and frequency of
gist increases. It may be that infants are more on the
verbatim end of the continua due to their lack of language
skills which prevent them from transferring essentially motor
or perceptual representations into more abstract (gist-like)
propositions during the encoding stage. However, Leichtman
and Ceci argue that infants are not incapable of gist-like or
fuzzy representations. They suggest further that the greater
the clarity with which incoming information is perceived by
the infant, the greater the probability that any gist-like
representation of the information will be formed.
Since verbatim traces decay faster than fuzzy traces and
have a narrower range of retrieval cues, one would expect that
if infants' memories are composed mostly of verbatim traces
that it would be difficult to recall events which occurred
during this time period later on in life. This would
especially be the case under free recall demands (as in so
many studies exploring early memories are) since events
occurring later in childhood have a greater probability of
having been encoded in a gist-like manner and thus have
13
decayed at a slower rate and are accessible by a greater
number of cues.
Rather than dismiss Pillemer and White's advocation of a
dual memory system as Howe and Courage do, Leichtman and Ceci
offer that Pillemer and White's second system, which is the
social system, can be interpreted in terms of where particular
memories fall on the fuzzy to verbatim continua. In
particular, if
. . .the content of this sort of early fuzzy trace does
not lend itself to socially induced retrieval, such
early memories will manifest themselves only in
nonverbal forms. And, as infantile amnesia would
suggest, those traces that are only encoded in an
inadequate verbatim manner by the infant's memory
system will be lost. (Leichtman and Ceci, 1992,
p. 208)
They believe the shift in cognitive capabilities related to
increased linguistic capabilities produces greater gist-like
representations of events allowing for later recall of these
events
.
As is apparent from this brief review of the literature
on infantile amnesia, one problem is that there is no one
accepted definition of the term. However, in general, one
component of infantile amnesia that seems to be agreed upon
is the inability to verbalize early memories; and as the vast
majority of the literature illustrates, this phenomenon does
exist. As a field, however, we are still in the beginning
stages of collecting data to know whether this phenomena is
due to the actual lack or nature of early memories, or if the
14
problem is in our attempts to bring forth the memory by
focusing on verbal requirements and techniques.
Long-Term Memory for Early Events
Very few studies have examined, in a controlled
environment, memory for events occurring in the first year of
life. Myers, Clifton, and Clarkson (1987) were lucky enough
to have access to a group of subjects that had experienced a
unique laboratory event during their first year of life and
were able to bring them back two years later to see what they
would remember.
Subjects had participated in an auditory localization
study when they were 6-40 weeks of age in which they
experienced 15-19 sessions during this time period. Sessions
involved reaching for sounding objects in both the light and
dark. Needless to say, this was a very unique experience and
contained many elements that would not be encountered outside
of the laboratory environment. It was also an event that was
repeated many times. For the subsequent memory study,
subjects returned to the laboratory when they were almost
three years old. The room itself, the apparatus, the
experimenter, and the procedure (except for the addition of a
few memory probes) were exactly the same during the follow-up
session as they had been during the original sessions. An
age-matched control group who did not have the earlier
experiences also was tested.
15
Of interest here is not only if the subjects would
remember, but also how they would express their memory.
Specifically, would these now verbal children express memory
of an event which occurred while they were nonverbal in words?
Results indicated that the children did remember their earlier
experiences. However, with the exception of one child,
subjects did not verbally recall the experience. Rather their
memory was expressed in their behavior — they were more
interactive with the stimuli and they were more likely to
reach and grasp the sounding objects in the dark. Even though
these verbal children did not express their memory verbally,
their verbal capabilities did not impede their memory from
being expressed in their behavior. The memory did not become
inaccessible. Myers et al. concluded that "under conditions
of virtually complete contextual reinstatement of the
environment and procedures of very early event experiences,
but still after a 2-year period which represented two-thirds
of their life span, children under 3 years of age retained
memory for early action sequences" (1987, p. 132).
Perhaps the total reinstatement of the context is what
triggered the memory of the repeated event. If the context
had not been completely the same, would the results have been
different? (This type of question will be further explored in
the section on reminders) . Had the event not been repeated
numerous times would the results be different? And what about
the uniqueness of the environment? Surely these children did
16
not encounter the contextual cues outside the laboratory; is
this a factor?
Perris, Myers, and Clifton (1990) decided to look into
the question about the effect of repeated experiences. Using
a procedure similar to that of the preceding experiment,
children who were in the laboratory when they were 6.5 months
of age to participate in a sound localization task in the
light and dark were brought back one or two years later (so
subjects were either 1.5 or 2.5 years old). Thus, instead of
having 15-19 exposures to the task, they had one. The
procedure was more or less the same as the early experience
except for the addition of a few memory probes and that for
the second half of the trials, subjects were instructed to
find the sounding object. (Half of the older group also
received a reactivation treatment; results of which will be
discussed in the next section.) Researchers found that "In
virtually every comparison on trials in the dark, the
experienced groups performed differently than children in the
control groups " (Perris et al., p. 1804). Consequently,
Perris et al. concluded that the children were able to
remember a single event that occurred during the first year of
life. So one can conclude that it was not the numerous
exposures in the Myers et al. study that prompted behavioral
expression of memory. However, it must be remembered that
this follow-up also occurred within the original context.
Given this, Perris et al. found it interesting to note that
17
physical, neurological, and cognitive changes did not impede
memory
.
Reminders and Reactivation
As adults most of us have encountered a certain sight,
sound, or smell which has then brought forth a flood of
memories. It does not happen every time, just sometimes. Why
is it that certain stimuli are effective reminder cues while
others are not? These reminders are an interesting phenomenon
in general, but even more so when considering the early
memories of infants and young children. Would we be able as
adults to "tap" more early memories if we were provided with
the "right" reminder? Would children's memories "improve" if
we provided the right reminder? It is critical while
exploring the nature of early memories to have an
understanding of the effects of reminders and the reactivation
phenomenon, especially since the studies just reviewed both
employed total reinstatement of the original context.
Campbell and Jaynes (1966)
,
working with animals, are
credited with beginning the exploration into reminders. Their
work with rats used a procedure they labeled reinstatement, by
which they denote "a small amount of partial practice or
repetition of an experience over the developmental period
which is enough to maintain an early learned response at a
high level, but is not enough to produce any effect in animals
which have not had the early experience" (p. 478). Twenty-
18
five-day-old rats learned to fear the black compartment of a
cage by experiencing shocks. During the next month,
reminders, which consisted of 2-s shocks of the same
intensity, were given at 7
,
14, and 21 days after training and
the animals were then tested at 28 days. Results of testing
illustrated that rats with the early experience and given
reminders demonstrated significantly more fear of the black
compartment than rats who had the same early experience but
did not receive the reminder shocks, and also more than those
rats who did receive the reminders but did not have the early
experience. Campbell and Jaynes consider this reinstatement
phenomenon to be a major mechanism by which early experiences
are retrieved and even incorporated into an adult's memory.
They feel that language-based culture of man, including
parental reminders, taboos, etc. allow frequent reinstatement
of experience which permits memory of it.
Campbell and Spear's (1972) review of the animal
literature supported some basic "common sense" assumptions.
Studies up to this time showed that the longer the duration of
the reinstatement, the better the retention. Studies also
showed that reinstatement of the conditioned stimulus is more
effective than reinstatement of the unconditioned stimulus.
Spear's (1973) continuing examination of the reactivation
paradigm expanded our understanding of the nature of the
reminder. He states that reactivation does not constitute an
entire training trial nor does it require the exhibiting of
19
the learned task. Also, any new learning caused by the
reactivation is unable to explain the retention enhancement.
Effective reactivation need not include the conditioned
stimulus but can utilize contextual cues from the original
learning environment. Bouton and Bolles (1985) in their work
with rats also found that contextual stimuli have an important
role in reinstatement.
Spear differentiates four types of reactivation
treatments which should be discussed, as they are crucial for
understanding the manipulation in infant studies and the
current work. These include warmup, reinstatement, direct
reactivation, and implicit reactivation. Warmup is "the
consequences of reactivation treatments that immediately
precede the retention task, or in some cases, the consequences
of the first few trials" (1973, p. 169). Spear reserves the
term reinstatement to refer to several reactivation treatments
that are evenly dispersed over the time interval between
training and testing. Direct reactivation involves a single
reactivation treatment given some time between the training
and the testing, but does not have to be immediately preceding
the test. Implicit reactivation involves a single treatment
during the interval that includes a manipulation intended to
modify the memory but which is not assessed until the
retention.
Warm-up treatments are often unsuccessful according to
Spear, especially with animals. He believes that often this
20
is the case because a number of cues of the training session
are not noticed by the animal and therefore are ineffective as
reminders. But this is actually a reason all types of
reactivation treatments can be unsuccessful. Another possible
hypothesis for this ineffectiveness is the need for motor
activities in order to bring forth the memory. A retention
deficit, called the Kamin effect, has been found in direct
reactivation treatments with animals if the interval between
the reminder and test is one to six hours. This is to say,
the reminder is effective if testing occurs within one hour or
after six hours. Consequently, retention evaluated a day
later can be greater than that just a few hours after
reactivation. Spear and his colleagues in some of their work
with animals have attributed this effect to the influence of
the hormone ACTH. During stressful times, the hormone is
inhibited and it takes time for the system to become adjusted
to the stress level and achieve balance. These effects remind
us that it is necessary to consider physiological and
psychological states at both the time of training and the time
of testing and their possible influence on the retrieval of
memory
.
According to Spear, "the effectiveness of retrieval
depends upon the availability of a sufficient number or kind
of retrieval cues at the moment expression of memory is
required" (1973, p. 181). Smith and Spear (1978) examined the
effect of reactivation following retroactive interference. In
21
their study, 60-day-old rats received a source of retroactive
interference with no shock 24 hours after training and then a
reactivation treatment or no reactivation treatment at all.
The reactivation treatment involved two 55-ms shocks
administered 10-min prior to a test session that occurred at
either 24 hours or seven days after training. For both test
sessions, the reactivation treatment effectively increased
retention. They concluded that "it appears that this
reactivation treatment must have aroused common affective or
stimulus properties with the target memory in order to elicit
retrieval of that memory" (Smith and Spear, 1978, p. 292).
Continuing work by Spear and his colleagues have revealed
some results that are hard to explain and go against the
earlier "common sense" assumptions. In experiments performed
by Miller, Jagielo, and Spear (1990 and 1991) with 18-day-old
rats, they found that direct reactivation with the reinforced
stimulus or an implicit reactivation with a novel stimulus did
not act as an effective reminder for a 3 hour test. Possible
explanation for this is the change of the stimulus from
training to reactivation. The reinforced stimulus during
training was followed by a shock, but it was not during the
reactivation treatment. A novel reactivation stimulus was
effective for longer retention (24 hours) supporting the
Miller et al. (1991) notion that "for a stimulus to serve as
effective prior-cuing treatment, it need not match the stimuli
present at the time of training but rather must match the
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subjects' internal representation of those stimuli" (p. 257).
So, for example, a novel odor may be an effective reminder,
but only if the concept of odor was encoded at training.
With the exception of the studies of long-term memory for
infancy mentioned above, the majority of work related to
reminders has been carried out by Rovee-Collier and her
colleagues with 2- to 6-month-old infants, using a mobile
conjugate reinforcement paradigm in which infants learn to
manipulate a mobile by footkicks. Rovee-Collier created this
paradigm in response to her dissatisfaction with the visual
attention paradigm which uses the habituation technique, as
she believes that her learning paradigm is better for actually
illustrating the memorial capabilities of infants, and
evaluating the effects of reminders (Rovee-Collier & Hayne,
1987). Rovee-Collier 1 s view is that a reminder involves some
sort of reinstatement of the training context. She agrees
with Campbell and Jaynes that reinstatement is the possible
mechanism by which the effects of early experience are
perpetuated. This then, according to Rovee-Collier, gives
memory the function it needs to continue to exist. Although
the reinstatement procedure as described by Campbell and
Jaynes contained repeated exposures to the training context,
Rovee-Collier employs single reactivations since Spear and
Parsons (1976) found that single exposure would suffice in
reactivating the memory. Rovee-Collier chose to provide a
reactivation treatment 24-hours before retention testing. She
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attributes her choice of this 24-hour reminder to Spear and
Parsons since they chose such a delay at first to minimize
unconditioned consequences of the treatment that might occur
if the reminder was presented only a few minutes prior to
testing. (Their later experiments do use shorter delays.)
All of these procedures rest on the assumption that memories
do not disappear but that they lie dormant until they are
reactivated.
In her earliest studies, Rovee-Collier and her colleagues
trained three-month-old infants on two consecutive days to
operate a mobile. A reactivation treatment given to some
infants 13 days later involved a three-minute noncontingent
exposure to a moving mobile. All infants were tested 24 hours
after that for 14 -day retention. Two control groups were
used — one receiving training but no reactivation and one
receiving reactivation but no training, as described in
Sullivan (1982) . Results showed that the experimental group
performed at 14 days at the same high level as one day after
training. Their performance was much better than either of
the control groups, indicating that it was the combination of
the reminder and prior training that permitted demonstration
of the memory.
One question that arises is whether or not this reminder
worked because of the time interval between the original
training and testing. Using a similar procedure to that
described above, again with three-month-old infants, retention
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tests were administered 28 and 35 days after training, with a
three minute noncontingent reminder cue given 24 hours prior
to testing. Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) report that the
reminders were effective for testing at 28 days but overall as
a group they were not effective at 35 days. Parallel work
with two-month-old infants found that even though they
exhibited poor performance on the original 24-hour test, with
a reminder 24 hrs before the 14
-day retention test, they
performed better. (As a group the two-month-olds performed
poorly on the 14th and 35th day retention tests.) From these
data Rovee-Collier concluded that " the age of the infant is
not the factor that limits the interval after which a reminder
will be effective. Rather, memories that have been forgotten
longer may be more difficult to access or may take longer to
dredge up following a single-reminder procedure" (Rovee-
Collier and Hayne, 1987, p. 204-205). Consequently , length
of the delay is a factor in whether or not this three-minute
reminder will be effective.
One area that Rovee-Collier does not really consider is
that of individual differences, and it would seem that
possible differences should be explored. Wachs (1984) in
reviewing infant memory data stresses that individual
differences in reinstatement will lead to individual
differences in memory performance.
Is a 2 4-hour reminder cue the only type that is
effective? Rovee-Collier administered 24-hour reminder cues
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because in addition to Spear and Parsons' work, her previous
studies found 15-minute and one-hour cues to be totally
ineffective and eight-hour cues to be effective for some
infants but not for the majority of the group. She attributes
part of this difference possibly to sleep as a reduction of
external demand on cognitive availability. But she does not
adequately explain this hypothesis nor does she really
interpret her results in light of it. We do not know how long
her subjects slept, if they all slept the same amount of time,
what type of sleep they experienced, etc. Surely, 24 hours
allows for more possibilities of encountering other stimuli.
Would not some other time delay be the most effective if sleep
was indeed the determinant?
In addition to the length of time prior to retention, it
appears that the length of the reminder itself is important.
Rovee-Collier used a three minute reminder because she feels
that the result of the reminder is not an immediate expression
of the memory desired but that it takes a while to retrieve
the memory — a warm up effect that she claims has been
documented both in human and animal literature. But why three
minutes? She claims that this length of time is needed
because infants lack the extensive networks of associations,
particularly language-based associations, which facilitate
retrieval. But is this true? This does not correspond with
the animal literature. Reminders used by Spear and his
colleagues have been as short as a portion of a second.
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Rovee-Collier concentrated on her assertion that the
reminder needs to be similar to the testing context. To her,
this is even more crucial than having the testing environment
the same as the training. An effective reminder must be
highly specific to what the infant originally encoded. This
is in accordance with Tulving's encoding specificity principle
(Tulving, 1983) . While exploring the nature of the reminder,
Rovee-Collier conducted a number of studies in which she
manipulated different parts of the context for the reminder
and observed their subsequent effect on memory retrieval. She
found that not all aspects of the original training context
were equally effective as reminder cues. She found also that
the longer the time delay from training to testing, the
greater the need for the context of the reminder to match that
of the training sessions.
Rovee-Collier has continued to pursue this line of
investigation into the nature of infant memory and the role of
reminders in retrieval. Greco, Hayne, and Rovee-Collier
(1990)
,
working with three-month-old infants in the same
mobile conjugate paradigm, found that the reminder itself did
not have to be exactly as it was in the training session.
They found that a reminder from the same category as the
training session could be an effective reminder as long as the
training included use of variable stimuli. Boiler et al.
(1990) tested six-month-old infants in the mobile conjugate
paradigm using a two-minute reminder at 30 minutes, 1 hour, 2
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hours, 4 hours, 8 hours, or 24 hours before testing or no
reminder at all. Testing occurred at 20 days for the control
group and 21 days for all others. They found that the control
group and the 30-minute group showed no retention at all. The
1-hour and 2-hour groups' retention was poor. Retention for
the 4-hour group was excellent while the 8-hour group showed
no retention. Retention was also evident at 24 hours. The
other experiments reported by Boiler et al. (1990) on the
effect of context on remembering all used a 24-hour reminder
cue. They conclude "that 6-month-old infants are unable to
access either an original memory... or a reactivation
memory. . .after lengthy intervals" (p. 778) even though 3-
month-old infants are capable of doing so. They attribute
this to rapid modification of memories. But is this really
the case? Perhaps this is due to the change from a three-
minute reminder to a two-minute one. Perhaps it is because of
the additional week of time elapsing before testing. Perhaps
the 2 4-hour reminder cue is not effective for this age group
due to something other than the modification of memories. One
might question why they did not use a four-hour reminder,
which they found to be the most effective in their first
experiment. Their conclusion seems inappropriate without
further research into the nature of differences in
effectiveness of reminder cues at three and six months of age.
Using the same mobile reinforcement paradigm, recent
results reported by Hayne and Findlay (1993, March) illustrate
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the effectiveness of the training context as a reminder.
Working with 3-month-old infants, Hayne and Findlay found that
for up to four weeks providing a reminder cue of the training
context alone was as effective of a reminder as providing the
mobile in the context. In fact the memory retrieved after the
context alone reminder was as specific as the memory retrieved
after the mobile/context reminder. Exposure to the context
was able to cue retrieval of other attributes of the memory of
the original event. Hayne and Findlay concluded that:
...preverbal infants rely heavily on contextual cues
to organize and retrieve information they have learned
about the world. In this way, context provides the
"glue" that binds similar events together. (1993, March,
p. 6) .
One final finding of interest that has been reported by
Rovee-Collier and her colleagues involves features and feature
relations. Bhatt (1993, March) recently reported that infants
can remember perceptual features even when they no longer
remember feature relations (or how the features associate with
one another) . This result was interpreted to mean that even
though both the features and the relations are part of the
memory representation, the individual features are maintained
independently of the relations and in fact are given a
privileged status.
A reminder cue in memory research with older children was
used by Perris, Myers, and Clifton (1990). They found that
the employment of a 3-second reminder of the original
experimental context to 2-1/2 year old children one-half hour
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prior to testing resulted in "facilitated performance" (p.
1805) in demonstrating memory of an event that took place two
years earlier. Why was this ever so brief reminder, so close
to testing, effective for 2-1/2-year-olds?
Reminders and their role in memory retrieval are both
fascinating areas of study but as is evident here from this
review we still do not know very much about them. One thing
we definitely know is that for effective reactivation, the
stimuli used in the reminder must have been present in one way
or another and noticed during acquisition or training (Spear,
1976)
.
Scripts and Their Relation to Memory
The point of Spear's mentioned above, that a reminder
will only be effective if in one way or another it was encoded
during the training, ties to another large literature relating
to the role of scripts in memory.
Following the theory of Schank and Abelson, Nelson (1986)
considers a script "an ordered sequence of actions appropriate
to a particular spatial-temporal context and organized around
a goal" (p. 13) . The script specifies places for people,
actions, and things that are filled by the default values if
not presented in the context. Scripts are learned and are a
function of experience. Overall, scripts provide a predictive
role, providing a set of expectations, as they are theories
about what happens in certain events and they allow for
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organization of knowledge and memory. Scripts can exist
within scripts and may contain different possible paths for
pursuit.
Mandler (1988) states that memory for a situation relies
on what is noticed at the time and how what is noticed is
conceptualized. According to script theorists such as Farrar
and Goodman (1990), children interpret new situations by what
they already know. This view can possibly explain some
aspects of infantile amnesia. It may be difficult to pinpoint
early memories because at the time of the event or later,
children are not exactly aware of the exact occasion within
the calendar year, and context is not always encoded as part
of the memory.
Studies by Hudson and Nelson (1986) demonstrate that 3-
and 5-year-old children draw from general event knowledge and
scripts. Familiarity with events was found to have a strong
effect on both general and episodic representations. After
one experience, children's recall was very episodic in
context. But with more experience with the event, children's
recall, was more general and contained less details. However,
when an event was more personally meaningful, a more detailed
account was given. Hudson and Nelson believe that these
results support a modified constructive account of the
development of autobiographical memory. They also remark on
the difficulty of finding effective cues.
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Mandler in her 1990 (Mandler, 1990a) commentary raised
some important concerns about whether or not adults provide
the appropriate cues to children. Verbal cuing may not be the
appropriate method for accessing early memory. Perhaps it is
necessary to provide the actual cues of the event in order for
retrieval to occur. She believes that it is impossible to
know exactly what is there without knowing how to
systematically cue.
Findings by Winograd and Killinger (1983) regarding
flashbulb memories indicate that older children and adults are
capable of "comprehending the significance of the event and
because his or her life conforms more to a pattern of regular
activities, he or she forms a richer representation of highly
significant events that disrupt these activities" (p. 421)
.
This richer representation during encoding allows for greater
recall later. Consequently, having scripts provides the
ability to focus on more of the unusual aspects of the event,
thereby actually encoding more and perhaps encoding better.
Sheingold and Tenney (1982) conducted an interesting
study on the memories of young children for the birth of a
younger sibling. Although there are some potentially serious
methodological problems with their questions, they found that
children who were less than 4 years of age at the time of the
sibling birth could not recall the event. They believe that
the child must master language sufficiently to rehearse the
event in order to remember it and that they must have certain
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schemes or scripts established so that they know what is not
normal. They agree with Nelson (1988) that most children
develop well-organized scripts for their daily lives at around
the age of 3-4 years. Absence of a script for daily life led
to absence for memory of the unusual event of the birth of a
sibling.
In a more recent study similar to Sheingold and Tenney's,
Usher and Neisser (1993) asked college students about four
events (birth of a sibling, hospitalization, moving, and death
of family member) occurring during the ages of 1 to 5 years.
They found that the offset of amnesia is not the same for all
events. That is, it depends on the nature of the event
itself. Birth of a sibling and hospitalization occurring at
age 2 were remembered whereas family deaths and moving were
not remembered until after age 3. Their results indicated
that certain elements did not contribute to the offset of the
amnesia while others did. First, reported affective state was
unrelated to the amount of recall. Second, the influence of
access to family stories and photographs depended upon age at
time of the event. For children less than 3 years of age
access to such items resulted in less recall. But the recall
of children 4 and 5 years of age was strengthened with access.
Third, recency of the last opportunity for rehearsal of the
event was unrelated to amount of recall. And fourth, the
frequency of the reported event rehearsal (both overt recall
and covert reflection) was positively correlated with recall.
33
Usher and Neisser suggest that amnesia for events in the first
few years of life is the result of poor understanding of the
event and the significance of the event. They believe that,
"Where there is no schematic understanding of individual
events and no schematic life narrative to interpret them,
little recall can be expected" (Usher and Neisser, 1993, p.
164) .
Loftus (1993) cautions researchers not to accept Usher
and Neisser 's results (especially those contradicting
Sheingold and Tenney's regarding memories of birth of a
sibling)
.
She believes that the "memories" of their subjects
may in fact be educated guesses that are the result of general
knowledge of what must have been and information received
after the age of 2. At least three elements would allow
subjects to be able to do this. First, it is easy to answer
some of the questions correctly without relying on memory.
Second, plausible answers given by subjects could go
unchallenged by mothers (who were asked to confirm memories) .
Third, the differential effect of access to family stories and
photographs may simply reflect younger children readily
attributing their "memory" to the external source.
The issues that Loftus raises pose some serious questions
for memory researchers using real life events. To avoid
Loftus' criticisms, researchers would have to create a
controlled event and prevent access to any permanent record.
This event would also have to include aspects that are not
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part of the subjects' general knowledge (or scripts) so that
guessing would be ineffective.
As Farrar and Goodman (1990) note, the influence of
scripts or schemas is not always positive. Scripts can help
or aid retrieval of an episodic event by lending support for
prototypical behavior, thus guiding the establishment of an
episodic representation. However, scripts can also impede
retrieval of specific details as memory may be subjected to
distortion towards the expected. Farrar and Goodman's results
allowed them to conclude that younger children are more script
dependent than older children for many memory tasks. This is
in agreement with Nelson's claim that the establishment of a
script is necessary before a child can have an episodic
representation or autobiographical memory of an event. As
scripts are beginning to be more defined, they are depended
upon more for understanding situations and thus influence
memory more. One caveat here, however, is that "any age group
will function at different levels of schema dependency
depending on the complexity of the event being encountered"
(Farrar and Goodman, 1990, p. 58). The processes of script
confirmation and deployment go on throughout one's life.
Confirmation of a script occurs when a situation is
encountered for which a script is already formed and in the
person's repertoire while script deployment is the process
that allows script consistent information to require little
attention so that attention can be focused on those elements
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that are inconsistent with the script. So what happens is
that people attempt to first confirm a script and then deal
with the discrepancies which then form the elements of
episodic memory. Farrar and Goodman's experiments focusing on
episodic vs. script memory found that younger children have
trouble deploying scripts thus giving them less of an episodic
memory ability. Nelson's claim that children are incapable of
autobiographical memory before they have script ability is an
additional explanation for infantile amnesia. There's nothing
there to be recalled as the child is unable to organize the
information.
The current literature, as this brief review illustrates,
forces the conclusion that there exists a dialectical
relationship between scripts and memory. More studies are
really needed to gain a better understanding of what
influences what.
Expression of Memory
One further caveat needs to be emphasized before moving
to the current research: Memory can be expressed in many
different ways. As Spear (1984) states "...we must measure
the variety of behaviours that can express memory" (p. 361) .
Researchers need to be aware of this variety or they will
unknowingly dismiss true exhibition of memory and never really
appreciate nor understand the workings of memory.
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A number of recent studies have relied on direct motor
behavior rather than verbal recall. The Myers et al. and the
Perris et al. studies have already been described. Meltzoff
(e.g., 1988) uses imitation and particularly deferred
imitation as evidence of recall in the preverbal child. In
his 1988 study, Meltzoff tested 9-month-old infants and found
that even after a delay of 24 hours infants imitated simple
actions they saw adults perform early. It should be
remembered that these infants had not performed the tasks on
day one, so they are not reproducing the activity on day two
because of a memory for their own actions on day one but
rather a memory for the displays themselves (unlike Rovee-
Collier's studies in which infants' own activity is the
content of the memory)
.
Fivush and her colleagues have also utilized non-verbal
recall measures in some studies. For example, Fivush, Kuebli,
and Clubb (1992) used both verbal and behavioral recall
measures in their study of 3-5-year olds' event representation
of three kinds of sequences (logical-invariant, logical-
variable, and arbitrary-invariant) . The behavioral measures
involved reenactment of the original tasks. They found that
their results were affected by the specifics of the event
organization and the type of recall tasks, not by the specific
components of the event itself. Logical events were recalled
in a better organized manner than arbitrary events in both
verbal and behavioral recall. Also, subjects recalled more
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logical events under verbal recall and more invariant events
under behavioral recall. Spear's idea of different levels of
expression of memory is clearly useful here, if one of these
two measures had not been employed, the researchers would have
arrived at a different position regarding the memorial
abilities of their subjects.
In addition, motor activity has been found to be an
influential factor at the time of encoding. That is,
children's recall is better for activities which they perform.
Jones, Swift, and Johnson (1988) carried out activities with
3 and 4-1/2 year old children in an unique setting. Testing
sessions occurred, not in the same context, either the same
day, 1 week later, or 8 weeks later. Open-ended recall
questions were asked and then more specific questions followed
regarding activities and objects. Recognition tasks were also
administered. Their results demonstrated that 3- and 4-1/2-
year-olds performed similarly not only in the recognition
task, but also in recall of the activities performed. Object
recall for 3-year-olds was poorer than that of the 4-1/2-year-
olds. Activities were well retained, while objects were more
susceptible to forgetting. Consequently, Jones et al.
concluded that it is the type of memory solicited that
demonstrates any difference between these two age groups,
rather than a generalized age-related competency
differentiating them.
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Aim of Present Study
As is evidenced by the preceding review of the
literature, our knowledge of early memory and how it may be
expressed is still very limited. The aim of the study
reported here was to provide further information about the
duration of long-term memory for events occurring in the first
years of life, and the nature of its expression in an
experimental context that unlike other studies does not
include a total reinstatement of the earlier context in
attempts to be more akin to how events are reexperienced in
everyday life.
Perris (1989) employed a learning paradigm in order to
assess the duration, accuracy and extent of infant memories
for an event involving objects which possibly could be
encountered outside the event as well. Ten-month-old infants
(N = 20) were trained on three consecutive days in their home
to manipulate a non-obvious control to operate one of two
target toys to a criterion of five target responses for each
session. A fourth session was conducted one week later during
which retention was tested and additional training/relearning
provided. Four months later, at 14-months of age, the infants
were revisited at home and retention was assessed. Although
all five visits were at individual homes, sessions were
conducted in a portable playtent to provide a constant
context. A naive experimenter conducted the 14 -month
retention session with the original experimenter present as
39
camera-person. An age-matched control group (N = 20) was
tested at home for the 14-month session only. At this 14-
month exposure, some of the original interior contextual cues
of the playtent were altered slightly for some subjects.
Although at 14-months of age, only one subject with previous
experience at 10 months produced the target response before
retraining began, Perris' findings allowed her to conclude
that most experienced infants expressed memory of the event by
rapid relearning, and the global familiarity with the play
environment seen in their willingness to remain in the
playtent.
At approximately 32 months of age, 18 months after the
last exposure to the toys, performance of a small number of
the experimental and control subjects from Perris' study was
compared to that of a new control group who had never seen the
toys before (N 's = 5) (Myers and Speaker, 1993, March).
These sessions, unlike the previous ones, were conducted in an
experimental room at the University which contained the front
section of the portable playtent, target and non-target toys,
and a set of standard preschool play materials. The session
included a period of free play, followed by a series of
behavioral prompts by the experimenter which led to a
demonstration of operating the target toy in five minutes.
Subjects were encouraged, but not forced, to operate their
target toy five times. This experience was obviously farther
removed from the original sessions which were conducted at
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home and focused on training. Although the two groups with
previous experience (Perris' experimental with five, and
controls with one, home session) did not differ from one
another in the number of successful response or touches of the
target toy, they did differ significantly from the new control
group who had no prior experience. However, only the subjects
with five prior experiences performed a successful response in
the first segment of the play session i.e., before a
demonstration by the experimenter, and reached criterion
early. The one-time experience group quickly reached
criterion after demonstration, while only four out of five new
controls ever reached criterion, with a lot of encouragement.
The researchers concluded that the experienced groups
expressed memory not only in rediscovering how to operate
their target toy but also in their delight in the toy, which
non-experienced peers found to be quite uninteresting.
The present study was designed to determine how, if at
all, memory for these event experiences at 10, 14, and 32
months is expressed at 60 months, when the context is even
farther removed from the original experiences. Questions of
interest included: is early memory aided by repetition of
events over time? Is the age at the time of initial encoding
an overwhelmingly influential factor? Overall, the motivating
factor for this study was the desire to see what is available
in memory at 5 years of age for events that were experienced
during the first years of life.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Subjects
A total of 3 6 children ranging in age from 55 months 2 3
days to 66 months 17 days (mean age: 61 months 8 days) were
recruited. One additional subject was eliminated from the
sample because of failure to cooperate and participate in the
tasks. Six sub-groups of subjects were defined based upon the
amount and timing of previous event experience. Five of the
six groups were comprised of subjects with some previous
experience while the sixth group had no previous exposure to
the event, and served as a control group. Groups were defined
as follows:
Group 10-14-32-60
Four children (2 male and 2 female) experienced the
target toy event at three earlier ages, 10-, 14-, and 32-
months. These children represented 4 of the 5 experimental
subjects in the Perris study who were tested at the 3 2 -month
follow-up. One family could not be located.
Group 14-32-60
Five children (3 male and 2 female) experienced the
target toy event at two earlier ages, 14- and 3 2 -months. This
was the full sample of control subjects in the Perris study
who were tested at the 3 2-month follow-up.
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Group 10-14-60
Ten children (5 male and 5 female) experienced the target
toy event at two earlier ages, 10- and 14
-months. They were
10 of the 15 experimental subjects in the Perris study who
were not tested at the 32-month follow-up. Of the remaining
subjects, 2 families could not be located, one child returned
but refused to participate, and 2 families were not contacted.
Group 14-60
Six children (3 male and 3 female) experienced the target
toy event at one earlier age, 14 -months. They were 6 of the
15 control subjects in the Perris study who were not tested at
the 32-month follow-up. Of the remaining subjects, 7 could
not be reached and 2 parents refused to participate.
Group 32-60
Five children (2 male and 3 female) experienced the
target toy event at one earlier age, 3 2 -months. They were 4
of the 5 control subjects included in the 3 2 -month follow-up
study and 1 extra control subject who participated at that
time.
Group 60
Six children (2 male and 4 female) served as new
controls. With no previous experience with the target toy,
they experienced the event for the first time at approximately
60 months of age.
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Design
As indicated above, children were selected for groups
based upon the number of prior experiences with the target
toy, and their ages when these events occurred. An attempt
was made to balance target toy assignment, and order of target
and non-target toys within groups, but this was compromised by
availability of subjects. (See Table 1.)
Apparatus
Playroom Environment
A large University room (600x660 cm) was arranged as a
playroom, to include three play locations, including the
original playtent used in the 10-, 14-, and 32-month events,
a playhouse, and an igloo. The layout of the room was such
that the playhouse was in the corner to the immediate left of
the entry door, the igloo and playtent were near the far wall
in the left and right corners, respectively. The corner to
the right of the entry door contained a small seating area for
parents as well as the video equipment for the video segment
(described below) . In the center of the room on a carpeted
area was a small circular wooden table with two chairs placed
across from one another.
The playtent consisted of two Fisher Price canvas
playtents adjoined as to double the interior space (180x90x135
cm) . The interior included cues from both the original and
altered interiors of the Perris study. The side walls of the
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Table 1
Target Assignment Across Groups and Sex
KOALA TARGET RACCOON TARCET
GROUP BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS
60 0 2 2 2
14-60 2 3 1 0
32-60 1 2 1 1
14-32-60 12 2 0
10-14-60 5 113
10-14-32-60 1111
9 12 8 7
Note : Group numbers refer to months of age at the time of
experiencing the target event (s)
.
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interior were adorned with diagonal stripes of blue and red
cloth tapes, and free-formed pieces of yellow and orange felt
were velcroed between the stripes. One section of one side
wall was covered with a yellow felt curtain. A green
terrycloth beach towel covered the floor in the back and a tan
bamboo mat covered the front.
The igloo was a white inflated plastic dome-shaped
structure that rested upon a plastic framing attached to a
circular wooden base. The interior (108x120 cm) consisted
only of the circular white walls and a brown utility carpet on
the floor.
The playhouse was made from corrugated cardboard covered
with a pale blue and tan patterned wallpaper and had a door
(90x64 cm) centered on the front wall which stood ajar. The
roof was covered with a peach laminated paper cloth that
overhung slightly in the front. The interior space
(125x107x125 cm) was uncovered tan cardboard. The floor was
partially covered by an orange shag rug folded into a quarter
circle shape.
Target and Non-Target Toys
The toys were made using animal hand puppets (koala and
raccoon) . The puppets (30 cm in height) sat upon metal
cylinders that were mounted on wooden bases (15x30x11 cm)
.
The bases included a hidden door (10x26x9 cm) that when opened
displayed a wooden insert with the shape of a little girl made
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of bells and sequins, and showed open space inside the base as
well. The doors opened by a simple non-obvious motor response
— pressing the left foot for the koala, and pulling a ring
connected to a string in a stomach pouch for the raccoon.
Each toy was stored in its own canvas bag (blue for the koala
and pink for the raccoon)
. Assignment of target and non-
target toys was based upon prior assignment except for the new
control group for which assignment was counterbalanced as much
as possible.
Recording Equipment
An audio cassette tape recorder was used to record all
sessions. The recorder was placed on a counter and positioned
as unobtrusively as possible.
Procedure
Subjects were be recruited by telephone calls to parents,
and scheduled for appointments. Each subject was tested
individually by a female experimenter, with a female observer,
as well as a parent, present. Sessions took place in the
playroom at the University and included seven segments
described in detail below — free play, structured play, an
object recognition task, a guessing game about target and non-
target toys, an intervening memory task, a videotape
presentation, and final questions. The entire session took
approximately 30 minutes to complete. Each session was scored
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online by the observer and verified with the audio tape
recording.
Free Plav
During this period, the subject was free to play in the
room, including exploring the three play locations. Also
available during this time were the toys and toy box from the
free play segment of the 3 2-month event, including a Fisher-
Price toy airplane with people, stove, blue skillet, blue
bowl, yellow spoon, yellow plate, orange teacup, small metal
airplane, blocks, and a green bunny with a yellow bow. This
period of unstructured play lasted approximately 3 to 5
minutes. The observer recorded order of exploration of the
play locations, times in and out of each location, and with
which toys the subject played. During this time the
experimenter explained the procedure to the parent and had
him/her sign the consent form (see Appendix A)
.
Structured Plav
This segment, and all those subsequent were recorded on
audio tapes. During this period, the experimenter introduced
a short-term memory task at each location. The specific
procedure and activities were not pertinent to the questions
of this study and will be detailed elsewhere. Their
importance here was to give children prolonged exposure (warm-
up reactivation) with the experimental stimuli under the kinds
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of natural change in emphasis and orientation that might
normally occur when children are re-exposed to context cues.
The experimenter informed the subject that they were going to
play at each location and directed the child to the first
position (counterbalanced across subjects)
. Each location had
a specific animal host, and a box containing at least 6 toy
items related to the play activity and locale (see Appendix B
for list of materials)
. All items were named at the location
by the experimenter. Each location had a goal activity —
fishing at the tent, planting flowers at the house, and
building a snowman at the igloo. Once a location activity was
completed, and items replaced in the box, the experimenter
asked the subject to name the items. The same procedure was
followed at the next two locations.
Object Recognition Task
The next segment was a Yes/No recognition task for
elements of the 10- and 14-month events and foils. Child and
experimenter sat at the circular table in the middle of the
playroom and objects were presented sequentially from a blue
hamper. Objects were presented in random order and named, and
the child was asked for each object "Have you ever seen this
before?" The objects and foils (in parentheses) included
Freddy the Fox used as a foil in the 14 -month discrimination
tasks (Gordy the Gorilla) ; box insert of little girl with
bells (new beaded design insert) ; felt amoeba- shaped cutout
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from the playtent wall (silky/glitter cover) ; and squeaky
green porcupine used to test handedness at 10 months (polar
bear)
.
There were photographs of the original experimenters
and corresponding foils of non-experimenters. Subjects were
allowed to handle objects and photographs were placed in
plastic frames so that they could be handled as well. Pre-
training with two items (a big bird finger puppet and a
picture of the current experimenter as a child) was carried
out to ensure the child's understanding of task demands. Yes-
no responses were recorded by the observer.
Guessing Game with Target and Non-Target Toys
Once the recognition task was completed, the experimenter
said, "Now we're going to play a guessing game." The toys
used here were the mounted raccoon and koala puppets in their
respective bags. Subjects with previous experience learned to
operate one or the other at the 10-, 14- and 32-month events.
Starting the guessing game with the target or non-target toy
was counterbalanced over groups. The procedure was the same
with each toy and was as follows:
1. The bag was placed on the table in front of the
child. The experimenter asked the child to guess what was in
it. The experimenter provided the correct answer (koala or
raccoon) if the subject was incorrect or gave no response.
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2. The experimenter asked "Can you guess what we call
him? (his name)" The experimenter provided the correct name
if the subject was incorrect or gave no response.
3. The subject was asked "Have you ever met my friend
before?"
4. The experimenter informed the subject that the animal
"does something special" and asked "Can you guess what he
does?" A further question (used at the 3 2 -month test)
:
" has a secret. Can you guess his secret?" was used
if necessary.
5. The subject was encouraged to handle the toy to make
it work. A prompt, pointing to the specific functional area
of the toy, was given after 30 seconds, if necessary, and a
demonstration of the operation of the toy 30 seconds
thereafter, if necessary. The observer rated the child's
degree of interactiveness on a five-point scale, and recorded
the time of the first successful response, the number of
successful responses, and the duration of play using a
stopwatch. Play continued for as long as the child wished.
If the child did not play with the toy or ceased play, the
experimenter asked, "Do you want to play with any
more?". If the subject wanted to stop, the experimenter
moved onto the next toy or segment. If the child continued to
play, the experimenter terminated play when the child operated
the toy 15 times.
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Intervening Memory Task
In this segment, subjects were asked questions regarding
the activities and toys at the play locations. As indicated
above, this "piggy-backed" experiment will be described and
analyzed separately, and is not directly pertinent to this
research.
Videotape Presentation
The parent present during the session was shown a
videotape of a 14-month-old child being trained on the target
toy for his or her child. The video was brought to the
subject's attention in order to see to what degree s/he
attended. The experimenter said, "I promised Mom (Dad) that
I would show her (him) a video of a baby playing with one of
our toys. You can watch, or play in the room if you want."
The video was shown for approximately 2 minutes. The observer
rated the degree to which the subject attended to the video on
a 5-point scale varying from "Does not watch at all" to
"Watches continuously," and noted as well any alternative play
behaviors.
Final Questions
The experimenter asked the subject to place the target
toy in front of his "home" ("Where do you think
lives?") and asked why. The experimenter also attempted to
elicit a preference for the toys or play locations ("I hope
52
you had a good time playing with me today. What did you like
the best?"). Then any further questions of the parent were
answered, the child was allowed to choose a book or toy to
take home as a prize, and was given a certificate
acknowledging his or her participation in the research.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
The results will be divided into sections corresponding
to the testing segments. The measures were designed to allow
for multiple comparisons among groups so that any effects of
varying degrees of previous event experience or recency of
experience on performance could be seen. For example, the
performance of inexperienced children was contrasted with that
of the two groups whose last experience was at 14 months, with
the three groups whose last experience was at 32 months, with
the three groups with one and two previous experiences, and
with the two groups with five or six previous experiences.
However, the very small sub-group samples and considerable
subject variability at times obscured any differences among
the children with varying degrees of previous experience. In
general, statistical tests and contrasts were carried out
first among all six sub-groups of subjects. If group
differences were not significant at the .25 alpha level, the
experienced sub-groups were collapsed as appropriate, and
compared against the non-experienced control group.
Free Play
During the free play segment, children were free to
explore the playroom, the play structures (playtent, house,
and igloo), and the set of standard preschool toys. The
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number of times the subject approached each location was
tallied. Also recorded was the order in which each location
was first approached. The specific toys played with were
recorded, and if the child did not play but remained by his or
her parent, that too, was noted.
Sixteen of the 3 6 subjects opted not to play and remained
by their parent. The proportions of children playing vs. not
playing in the sub-groups were approximately the same. A chi-
square test of independence indicated no overall difference
among experience groups, and no group differed significantly
from the controls.
Of the 20 children who played during this segment, 6
confined their play to the boxed toys and did not approach or
enter the play locations. Of the 14 children who did visit
the locations, 9 went to all 3. In all, 11 children explored
the tent, 6 of whom went there first. Comparisons among
experience groups compared to the control group on both these
measures showed no significant differences.
Although it was anticipated that this segment would
provide experienced children with an opportunity to express
a preference for the target playtent, the findings did not
show this pattern. However, this free play segment was also
intended to serve as a warm-up reminder of the original
experience for those children with prior experience with the
event
.
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Object Recognition Task
In this segment, three measures of correct recognition of
new and old items were determined separately for each child.
These included an overall percentage correct, percentage
correct on target-related items, and percentage correct on
context-related items, depending on the child's particular
past experiences, both within the experiment and without (as
parental confirmation allowed)
.
Of the 36 subjects, 22 responded "NO" to all items and
one answered "YES" to all. It was apparent that the
recognition scores as operational ized provided neither a
sensitive nor adequate measure of memory. No further analyses
were conducted and this measure will not be discussed further.
Guessing Game Segment
Multiple measures were taken for each toy during this
segment. These included physical interactiveness, latency to
first successful response, number of successful responses,
duration of toy interaction. Analyses of variance were
carried out on these measure with sub-group as the factor.
Supplementary analyses were carried out as a function of toy
order (target first or second), toy (target vs. non-target),
and target assignment (koala vs. raccoon)
.
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Physical Interactiveness
Physical interaction and exploration with each toy for
the period from presentation to the first successful response
was rated on a scale of 1 to 5 (l=no contact at all, and
5=almost continuous physical contact) . A summary of the mean
physical interactiveness scores (and standard deviations) for
experience groups and toys can be seen in Table 2. For the
target toy, mean scores ranged from 2.83 to 3.83. The no
experience group (Group 60) interacted least with the target
toy. For the non-target toy, mean scores ranged from 2.75 to
4.20. The most experienced group (Group 10-14-32-60) was the
least physically interactive with the non-target toy. An
analysis of variance carried out with sub-group and target vs.
non-target toy as factors indicated that there were no
significant main effects or interactions. Planned comparisons
between the no experience group and the experienced groups
also showed no significant differences. Overall, the groups
were equally interactive with both toys. Children's
interactiveness with the toys did not appear to be influenced
by whether the target was the koala (M=3.72) or raccoon
(M=3.61). An analysis of variance showed no significant
effect of target assignment.
As can be seen in Table 3, however, all children in all
sub-groups were more interactive with both toys when their
target toy was presented first. When the target was presented
first, children responded in a very active manner with the
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Table 2
Mean Physical Interactiveness Scores (and Standard
Deviations) for Experience Groups and Toys
TOY
GROUP TARGET NON-TARGET
60 2.833 3.000
(1.169) (1.673)
14-60 3.833 3.667
(1.472) (1.751)
32-60 3.600 3.400
(1.949) (1.817)
14-32-60 3.800 3.600
(1.304) (0.894)
10-14-60 3.700 4.200
(1.703) (1.476)
10-14-32-60 3.000 2.750
(1.826) (2.062)
Note ; Group numbers refer to months of age at the time
experiencing the target event (s)
.
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Table 3
Mean Physical Interactiveness Scores (and Standard
Deviations) as a Function of Target Order and Toy
TOY
TARGET ORDER TARGET NON-TARGET
Target First 4.000 4.167
(1.188) (1.249)
Target Second 3.000 2.944
(1.680) (1.662)
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toy, and this high level carried over to interaction with the
second (non-target) toy. This order effect on interactiveness
was significant for both the target and non-target toy
(target F ( 1 , 34) =4 . 25, p_<.05; non-target F( 1 , 34) =6 . 22 , p_<.02).
Successful Responses
The total number of successful responses to the target
and non-target toys were computed. Three children responded
15 times to one of the two toys and their play with the toy
was terminated by the experimenter. These children were from
three different groups (Group 14-32-60, Group 14-60, and Group
60) . Their data were statistical outliers and were eliminated
from the analyses conducted on the number of successful
responses only.
The mean number of successful responses (and standard
deviations) for experience groups and toys can be seen in
Table 4. For the target toy, the mean number of responses
ranged from 1.20 to 4.70. The no experience group (Group 60)
responded least while Group 10-14-60 responded most.
A similar pattern of response was seen with the non-
target toy. For the non-target toy, the mean number of
responses ranged from 1.80 to 3.40. The no experience group
(Group 60) made the least number of successful responses while
Group 10-14-60 made the most. An analysis of variance carried
out with sub-group and toy as factors indicated no significant
main effects; nor did any group differ significantly from the
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Table 4
Mean Successful Responses (and Standard Deviations)
for Experience Groups and Toys
GROUP TARGET
TOY
NON-TARGET TOTAL
60 1.200
(1.093)
1.800
(3.033)
3 . 000
(4.062)
14-60 2.000
(1.000)
2.000
(1.414)
4.000
(2.345)
32-60 3.000
(2 .828)
2 .400
(2.608)
5.400
(5.273)
14-32-60 2.000
(2.160)
2.750
(2.500)
4.750
(4.646)
10-14-60 4.700
(3.368)
3.400
(2.011)
8.100
(4.654)
10-14-32-60 1.500
(1.291)
2.250
(2.217)
3.750
(3.304)
Note : Group numbers refer to months of age at the time of
experiencing the target event (s)
.
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control group in separate planned contrasts. Thus, the groups
performed equally with respect to the number of successful
responses.
For most subjects, the number of successful responses did
not appear to be dependent upon order of toy presentation
(target or non-target first) and/or the target assignment
itself. There was one exception to this, however. Children
who had the combination of the raccoon as their target
toy, presented second, made few successful responses to their
target raccoon (M=1.13). Subjects in the other three
conditions (koala as target presented first, koala as target
presented second, and raccoon as target presented first) made
2.56, 4.10, and 3.17 responses to their target, respectively.
An analysis of variance carried out as a function of target
assignment and order indicated a significant Target x Order
interaction (F(l, 29) =4 . 06, p_<.05).
Latency to First Successful Response
The latency (in s) to the first successful response from
first exposure of the toy was recorded. There were 3 children
who never made a successful response to their target toy.
These children were from three different sub-groups (Group 10-
14-32-60, Group 14-32-60, and Group 60). These three children
and an additional two (from Group 60) also never made a
successful response to their non-target toy. Their data were
eliminated from the analyses conducted on the latency to first
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successful response for the particular toy(s) to which they
did not respond. Thus, 33 subjects contributed data for the
target toy, and 31 for the non-target toy.
The mean latencies (in s) to first successful response
(and standard deviations) for experience groups and toys can
be seen in Table 5. For the target toy, mean latencies ranged
from 23.17s to 60.91s. The no experience group (Group 60)
took the most time to their first successful response.
Indeed, the children in the no experience group took almost
twice as long as those in the other five groups. Although the
overall group effect was not significant, the planned
comparison between the no experience group (Group 60) and all
the experienced groups combined yielded a marginally
significant effect (F ( 1 , 31) =3 . 98 , p<.06). Latency to the
target toy was not dependent upon target assignment or order
of presentation. There were no significant effects in the
target by order analysis of variance.
Behavior with the non-target toy was very different.
Mean latencies to the non-target toy ranged from 39.49s to
67.96s. There was no overall significant effect of sub-group.
However, several planned comparisons revealed significant
differences in the latencies of specific sub-groups. Those
groups whose last experience was at 14 -months of age (Group
14-60 and Group 10-14-60 combined) took more time than the new
controls (Group 60) to produce a successful non-target
response (F ( 1 , 30) =4 . 62 , p<.04). Similarly, groups with only
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Table 5
Mean Latencies (in s) to First Successful Response (andStandard Deviations) for Experience Groups and Toys
GROUP TARGET
TOY
NON-TARGET AVERAGE
60 60.910
(37.850)
49.740
(57.973)
45.377
(37.440)
14-60 28.652
(30.361)
67.958
(14.197)
48.305
(9.123)
32-60 23.168
(20.679)
67.312
(19.678)
45.240
(15.920)
14-32-60 45.760
(21.931)
39.488
(5.398)
42.624
(11.674)
10-14-60 36.047
(26. 141)
47.465
(36.057)
41.756
(26.799)
10-14-32-60 49.693
(14.811)
41.263
(36.656)
45.478
(22.294)
Note : Group numbers refer to months of age at the time
experiencing the target event (s).
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one or two previous experiences (Group 14-60, Group 14-32-60,
and Group 32-60 combined) took longer than the controls to
respond successfully (F(l, 30) =4 . 119
, p_<.05). These effects
undoubtedly rest strongly on the behavior of the children in
the two groups with just one previous experience (Group 14-60
and Group 32-60) who took longer than the others to make their
initial successful non-target response.
Both target assignment and order of presentation of the
non-target toy affected mean latencies to the non-target toy.
Those children with the koala as target showed marginally
significantly longer latencies (M=61.22s) than those with the
raccoon as target (M=40.56s), (F(l,29)=3.73, p<.06). There
were marginally greater mean latencies to the non-target toy
when it was presented first (M=64.60s) rather than second
(M=43.86s), (F(l,29)=3.94, p_<.06).
Time of First Successful Response
Children's first responses were also classified as
falling into one of three time periods: (1) before an
experimenter prompt; (2) after the experimenter's prompt but
before a demonstration of the response; (3) after the
experimenter's demonstration. As previously indicated, three
children did not make any successful responses to the target
toy. With these children's data eliminated, 15 subjects made
their first successful response to the target pre-prompt, 13
post-prompt/pre-demonstration, and 5 post-demonstration. A
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chi-square test of independence indicated no significant
difference in period of responding related to sub-group.
However, when the data of all subjects, including the 3
non-responders, were considered, and responses categorized as
falling into just two time periods (pre-demonstration/post-
demonstration or never)
, differences in sub-group responding
emerged. Children with experience were more likely to respond
before a demonstration; 25 of the 30 experienced children
(83%) while only 3 of 6 inexperienced children (50%) did so
(X2 (l)=3.23, .05<p<.10). Children in two of the sub-groups
were especially consistent in responding early; 9 of the 10
subjects in Group 10-14-60, and all 5 of the subjects in Group
32-60 responded before a demonstration. Contrasts performed
between the no experience group (Group 60) and Group 32-60 and
Group 10-14-60 separately revealed that these differences in
performance were marginally significant (X2 (l)=3.42,
.05<p_<.10, and X2 (l)=3.20, .05<p_<.10, respectively).
Five children did not make any successful responses to
the non-target toy, as indicated previously. With these
children's data eliminated, 12 subjects made their first
successful response to the non-target pre-prompt, 10 post-
prompt/pre-demonstration, and 9 post-demonstration. The
pattern of distribution of responses in the sub-groups
differed considerably, and an overall chi-square test of
independence indicated a significant group difference
(X2 (10)=20.34, .025<p_<.05) . The contrast comparing all
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experience groups with the control group was not significant,
however
.
When the data of all subjects including the 5 non-
responders were considered, and response categorized as above
into two time periods (pre-demonstration/post-demonstration or
never)
,
9 out of 10 children in Group 10-14-60 responded
before a demonstration while only 2 of the 6 children in the
no experience group (Group 60) did. A contrast of the data of
these two groups indicated that this difference in period of
responding to the non-target toy was significant (X2 (l)=5.61,
.01<p_<.025). Interestingly, 8 of the 9 children responding
before a demonstration, also responded to the target toy
before a demonstration.
For both the target and non-target toys, the time of
first successful response was not contingent upon either
target assignment or order of presentation of toys. Chi-
square tests of independence indicated no significant
differences.
Duration of Plav
Interest in and willingness to stay with the toy was
measured by the duration (in s) of play following the first
successful response until the child or experimenter terminated
play. A summary of the mean duration of play (in s) following
first successful response (and standard deviations) for
experience groups and toys can be seen in Table 6. The
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Table 6
Mean Duration of Play (in s) Following First SuccessfulResponse (and Standard Deviations) for Experience Groups
and Toys
GROUP TARGET
TOY
NON-TARGET AVERAGE
60 51.240
(56.531)
34.950
(24.080)
43.095
(36.535)
14-60 46.923
(44.538)
26.292
(21.332)
36.608
(30.736)
32-60 42.720
(38.255)
35.384
(25.962)
39.052
(30.936)
14-32-60 64.626
(70. 356)
27.652
(19.597)
46.139
(44.716)
10-14-60 58.930
(36.622)
54.028
(39.126)
56.479
(32.611)
10-14-32-60 30.378
(24.589)
31.980
(47.213)
31. 179
(35.520)
Note : Group numbers refer to months of age at the time
experiencing the target event (s)
.
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duration of play with the target toy ranged from 30.38s to
64.63s. The most experienced group (Group 10-14-32-60) played
for the least amount of time, while Group 14-32-60 played
longest. For the non-target toy, the duration of play ranged
from 26.29s to 54.03s. Group 14-60 played for the least time
while Group 10-14-60 played for the most time. An analysis of
variance indicated no significant effects. Planned
comparisons indicated no group differed significantly from the
control group.
Although no influence of target assignment was seen for
the mean durations of time spent with either the target or
non-target toy, order of presentation affected behavior with
the target toy. All children tended to spend more time with
their target toy when it was presented first (M=64.78s) rather
than second (M=37.25s). This effect was marginally
significant (F(l, 34) =3 . 72
,
p<.06). No such effect was seen
for the non-target toy.
Verbal Queries
In introducing each toy in the guessing game segment, a
series of questions were asked. Children were probed to guess
what was hiding in each bag; and when the toy was revealed, to
guess its name. They were also asked whether the toy had been
seen previously, and whether they knew what it did, or the
toy's "secret." Few verbal reports were forthcoming, although
several children did guess a stuffed toy would be in the bag,
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and a few suggested correctly that the raccoon could be named
"Ricky." These answers seemed unrelated to previous
experimental experience, however. The "Ranger Rick" magazine
and television character seem to be the source of association.
Most children did not recognize the target and non-target
toys. Two children in Group 10-14-60 did answer yes correctly
to the question "Have you ever see him before?", one each for
the raccoon and koala.
Videotape Presentation
For the videotape presentation segment, an attention
score was assigned on a 5-point scale (l=never looks at video
monitor, and 5=continuous attention to video monitor) .
Alternative play and verbal behaviors were also noted.
A summary of mean video viewing scores (and standard
deviations) for experience groups can be seen in Table 7.
Scores ranged from 2.40 to 4.13. An analysis of variance
indicated no significant group effect. Planned comparisons
indicated that no group differed significantly from the
control group.
However, group differences were seen with respect to the
children's play behavior. Ten of the 3 0 experienced children
returned to the target toy and made successful responses.
Seven of the 10 also responded to the non-target toy.
Included in this group of children was one female subject
(from Group 14-32-60) who did not make any successful
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Table 7
Mean Video Viewing Scores (and Standard Deviations)
for Experience Groups
GROUP SCORE
Group 60 3.600
(1.114)
Group 14-60 3.300
(1.681)
Group 32-60 3.200
(1.643)
Group 14-32-60 2.400
(1.140)
Group 10-14-60 2.778
(1.302)
Group 10-14-32-60 4.125
(1.436)
Note : Group numbers refer to months of age at the time of
experiencing the target event (s)
.
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responses during the guessing game segment. None of the
children with no experience (Group 60) responded to either toy
during this segment. A comparison of all five experienced
sub-groups with the no experience control sub-group indicated
that this difference in spontaneous play with the toys was
marginally significant (X2 (l)=2.77,
.05<p_<.l0).
Final Questions
During this segment, two types of responses were
recorded. One question was about the location that the child
believed was the target's "home." The home guestion was
introduced late and therefore asked of only 18 children.
Overall, most children answered either "house" or "tent" (8
and 9, respectively). Only 1 child answered "igloo." Chi-
square tests of independence indicated no significant
differences as a function of sub-group.
The second question elicited any preference for
activities or items. No strong preferences for any single
item or location were seen. The children's responses included
a large variety of both items related to the target event
(e.g., "tent," "Ricky," "koala," "finding the secrets") or
those not related (e.g., "house," "going fishing"). Sixteen
responses were for items related to the previous experiences,
and 21 were for non-related items. Two children could not
decide on one item and gave two items; one child refused to
state a preference.
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Free Recall
During the debriefing of the parents, the spontaneous
recall of two children (one male and one female) for the same
element of the original event was reported. Both children
were in Group 10-14-60, the group which had received the home
training sessions at 10 months of age and the home test
session at 14 months of age, and which had not been to the
University for further questioning of the experience at 32-
months of age.
In both instances, the parent commented in a general way
about remembering the home visits when their child was a baby.
One child (MB) who had been sitting next to her mother, but
looking at the tent, suddenly asked the experimenter about a
light in the tent, "Does it have a light?" The mother of the
other child (TA) reported the following exchange that occurred
on their way to the University. The child asked if he had
been there before. The mother responded that he had
participated in a hearing study, but made no mention of his
involvement in the home study. The child then said "I
remember that tent" to which the mother replied "You do?" The
child continued "They had a light... they put it in the tent
and plugged it in." This recall was veridical. If the
natural lighting of the testing room in the home was poor, a
portable light was placed in the back of the tent to provide
better illumination for the video camera.
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Cumulative Memory Index
As a general summarizing measure of the children's
overall memory, a cumulative memory index score was computed
for each subject. This score was based on seven major
dependent measures considered independently above and could
range from 0 to 7
.
Subjects received one point for each of
the following criteria:
1. A physical interactiveness score for the target toy
greater than the mean score for all subjects (M=3.46).
2
.
More successful responses to the target toy than the
mean number of responses for all subjects (M=2.40).
3
.
First successful response to the target toy in less
time than the mean latency for all subjects (M=40.71s).
4. First successful response to the target toy occurring
before an experimenter demonstration.
5. Longer duration of play with the target toy (after
the first successful response) than the mean duration
(M=49. 14s)
.
6. Successful response (s) to the target toy during the
video segment.
7. Any verbal recall which could be confirmed.
The distribution of mean memory index scores for
experience groups can be seen in Figure 1. The mean score for
Group 60 was 1.33 which was much lower than the means for the
other groups which ranged from 2.5 to 4.10. The initial
analysis of variance indicated a marginally significant
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overall group effect (F (5 , 30) =2 . 07
,
p<.lO). Planned
comparisons among the experience groups were revealing. A
comparison of scores of the no experience group (Group 60) and
those of all experienced groups combined indicated that the
scores differed significantly (F(l, 30)=5.45, p<.03). Indeed,
all individual contrasts of experienced sub-group means with
the inexperienced group mean were either marginally
significant or significant (p's ranged from .062 to .005),
except for Group 10-14-32-60, the group with the most
experience. In contrast, the mean memory index score for the
group of children who shared the multiple experiences at 10
and 14 months with the most experienced group, but did not
participate at 32 months (Group 10-14-60) was the highest
(F(l,30)=9.26, p_<.005).
75
76
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Five-year-old children who experienced events at 10, 14
and/or 32 months of age demonstrated that they possessed
memories of the earlier experience (s)
,
even when there was not
a total reinstatement of the original context. Although
memory was neither complete nor expressed in the same manner
by all children, the experienced children performed
differently than age-matched controls who had no previous
experience on a number of behavioral and verbal measures.
Evidence of Memory
Shorter Latency to First Successful Target Toy Response
Children with previous toy experience made their first
target response in approximately half the time it took
controls to accomplish it. Although variability was high, a
contrast of latencies of all experienced children combined
into one group versus latencies for the no experience group
was marginally significant. Thus, experienced children were
able to make use of their earlier experience and the knowledge
they received from it — even if they were not consciously
aware of doing so.
Pre-Demonstration Successful Response to Target Toy
In addition to responding more quickly than their no-
experience peers, children with experience were more likely to
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respond before a demonstration. Twenty-five of the 30
experienced children responded before a demonstration (83%)
while only 3 of the 6 inexperienced children did so (50%) .
Children in Group 10-14-60 and Group 32-60 were especially
consistent in responding before a demonstration. Nine out of
10 children in the first group and all 5 of the children in
the second group responded before a demonstration. In all
instances these percentages were marginally significantly
different from the control group.
Spontaneous Target Toy Play During Videotape Presentation
Although children with experience and those without
performed approximately equally during the guessing game
segment when faced with the task of finding the toy's secret,
only the experienced children showed spontaneous responding
during the video segment when they were free to play with
anything in the playroom. In fact, 10 of the 30 experienced
children returned to their target toy and made successful
responses; included in this group was one child who did not
make a response during the earlier period. Although none of
the inexperienced children returned to the test toys, the
difference in spontaneous toy play was just marginally
significant.
The target play behavior illustrates interest and
pleasure in operating the toy which was not apparent during
the guessing game segment. It may be that during the guessing
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game segment, children in all groups interpreted the task
demand as finding the toy's secret and demonstrating their
knowledge by making it operate once. In both previous memory
assessments at 14- and 3 2 -months of age, the focus of each
session was on playing with the target toy. In contrast, here
there were other structured task demands introduced early
which may have de-emphasized toy play. Also, it is reasonable
to assume that 5-year-old children might consider the toy not
particularly interesting, possibly even simplistic, once they
discovered how to operate it. This was definitely the case
for the inexperienced children. Nonetheless, as in the 32-
month followup, previous experience with the toy provided some
children at least "with joy in a toy not fascinating to
inexperienced peers" (Myers and Speaker, 1993, March, p. 5).
Verbal Recognition and Recall
One of the questions of interest in the present study was
whether memory for events experienced by preverbal infants
would be expressed in a verbal manner. Or would any verbal
recognition and/or recall be offered only by children who
participated at 32-months, a time when children had
considerable verbal skill? We know that young children 2-3
years of age are able to talk about their memories. Fivush,
Gray, and Fromhoff (1987) found 2-year-old children were able
to participate in conversations about past events including
those experienced recently (within 3 months) and those more
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distant (more than 6 months). m fact, one child even
reported an event 10 months old.
Children in the present study gave very few verbal
confirmable reports of recognition and recall. Three children
did provide verbal reports, however; two children recognized
the toys, and one of these plus another child verbally
recalled additional aspects of the original event experience.
Interestingly, all three children were in Group 10-14-60,
the group which had received the home training sessions at 10
months of age and the home test session at 14 months of age,
and which had not been to the University for further
questioning of the experience at 32 months of age. We
suggested earlier that it was possible that only the children
who experienced the event at 32 months, when they were already
verbal, would express their memory through language. Clearly,
this was not the case. The multiple experiences in infancy
established a lasting representation which for these children
was not modified by a later exposure. True, they had no
opportunity to encode the experience in language, but now at
the age of five, it was possible to access the representation
and express memory in words.
Consequently, from these results, one can conclude that
although it is rarely that children provide verbal reports of
an event concentrated on motor performance that was
experienced during infancy, it is not impossible for them to
do so. There must exist some mechanism which allows for
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receding of memory traces that were originally encoded without
language.
Another fascinating feature of these findings is that two
of the verbal accounts were offered by 2 of the 3 children who
made no successful responses at 14 months. From their
behavior then, one might conclude that no memory had been
established in infancy. Yet, now almost 4 years later,
specific details of that experience were provided. This
extreme example of deviations in the pattern of memory
expression highlights the danger of underestimating memory
potential in very young children.
Cumulative Memory Index
To partially address the different patterns of memory
expression, a cumulative index was designed to include
multiple components. Such a measure should be more stable
than the individual independent measures which showed great
variability, and might therefore better capture memory.
Indeed, all the experienced groups scored higher on the
memory index than the no experience group. Children whose
last experience was at 14 months of age (i.e., Groups 10-14-60
and 14-60) significantly outperformed the group with no
experience. In addition, children whose first and only
experience was at 32 months of age (Group 32-60) also
performed better than their inexperienced peers. Children
with the most experience who had participated in the original
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infant study as well as the 32-month follow-up (Group 10-14-
32-60) did not differ significantly from the inexperienced
group. As discussed earlier this suggests that not only did
they not benefit from the additional experience, but that the
3 2 -month experience interfered with their memory
representation
.
General Discussion
Considerations of Task and Time
The primary goal of the present study was to evaluate
memory for an experience in infancy after long periods of
time. However, indexing event memory at different ages and
stages is a difficult task. Not only is it a challenge to
develop a task appropriate for the age of the children at the
initial experience, but it is also a challenge to provide
appropriate opportunities for demonstration of memory under
changed conditions.
We faced three major problems with our target toy task.
First, the task was designed to be of interest to 10-month-old
children. It was obvious at the 32-month follow-up that the
toy was not intrinsically attractive to pre-school children
and, therefore, our expectation for 5-year-olds was that this
would be the case even more so. Second, the task was also
designed such that 10-month-olds could easily learn to
manipulate the toy with training. Thus, although the toys
required a non-obvious motor response, it was not very
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difficult for an older child to locate and quickly determine
how to operate the toy. Most five-year-olds have a well
established script for exploring new toys and finding out how
they work. They do it quite often. Third, the task was
designed such that memory was to be expressed primarily
through behavioral measures such as operating the toy.
Although this was not problematic for the infants or even for
the pre-schoolers, it was a problem when five-year-olds were
tested. Five-year-old children are for the most part very
willing to comply with demands placed on them to perform.
Thus, it is not surprising that all but 3 children made at
least one response to their target toy when faced with the
request.
In longitudinal memory studies it becomes increasingly
difficult to provide a nonverbal activity that might reflect
memory for infancy at later ages. Thus, as it stands now,
there is no reason to pursue this set of studies further
unless we can devise linguistic tasks (recall and recognition
tasks) which make sense for assessment with older children.
Impact of Contextual Chancre
In attempting to simulate a more realistic occurrence of
re-exposure to earlier events, we wanted to move farther away
from both the original context of the infant event and the
context of the 3 2 -month follow-up. Total reinstatement of the
original context (such as in Myers et al., 1987 and Perris et
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al., 1990) or reinstatement with only slight changes in one or
two cues (such as work by Rovee-Collier and her colleagues)
have been shown to allow for memory to be expressed. The
context of the present study was unlike either of the two
previous events conducted with the target toys. Children were
brought into a playroom at the University as they were at the
32-month experience, but the room was much larger and
contained not only the playtent but two other equally imposing
play structures as well. Furthermore, novel play activities
were introduced at all three locations. Thus, again unlike
previous events, the focus of the session was not on the
interaction with the target toy. In fact, out of a session
which lasted approximately 30 minutes, the guessing game with
the target toys took about 10 minutes in the middle.
Moreover, even then the emphasis was not on relearning per se,
but on exploration. Thus, the context of the present study
was very different from either the home visits during infancy
or the modified free play session at 32-months.
Also unlike work by Perris et al. and Rovee-Collier,
children were not given any direct reactivation treatment
prior to the session. Subjects were exposed to one aspect of
the original context, the tent, during the early segments of
the session, which could act as a warmup reminder. However,
Rovee-Collier among others has demonstrated clearly that in
order to be effective, a reminder must be highly specific to
what the infant originally encoded. Relatively few of the
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children entered that playtent and even fewer crawled into it.
It is very possible, therefore, that since the infant events
took place within the tent, the exterior view may not have
been a sufficient reminder cue. Thus, given the absence of a
reminder cue and the radical changes in context, one could say
that we were setting the stage for memory failure.
Most memory researchers agree that the greater the
similarity between retrieval cues and the original events, the
greater the probability for retrieval. More specifically,
describing infant memory, Rovee-Collier has stated "how long
an event is remembered depends upon the memory contents at the
time it is accessed, the context in which retrieval has
occurred, and the number of times it has been retrieved"
(1990, p. 532)
.
Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) suggested one hypothesis
accounting for the contents of memory over time. They assume
that memories are hierarchically organized such that specific
details of proximal cues are forgotten first before general
features and distal cues. Proximal cues are defined as those
closely associated with the contingency such as the visible
characteristics of the target toys in our studies. Distal
cues, on the other hand, are those that can be considered part
of the setting or context such as the playtent and bag
concealing the toy. If the proximal cues have been forgotten
and the testing context does not match the represented context
in some manner, retrieval will not occur. Unfortunately, at
85
the immediate one week test at 10 months of age in the first
study, the only cue tested was the target toy to which the
children did react. At the 14-month test, distal cues related
to the interior of tent were manipulated; children were either
tested in the original playtent interior or in one which was
totally different. Although performance did not appear to
follow Rovee-Collier's hypothesis since girls tested with the
altered context outperformed girls tested with the original
context, Perris (1989) suggested that if one extended the
hypothesis the results could be accounted for. She speculated
that there may be levels of distal cues, so that when some
distal cues become fuzzy, the distal cues even further from
the proximal cues come into play. One could see the overall
structure of the playtent as an even more distal cue than its
interior, and the willingness of experimental subjects to
remain in the playtent could be viewed as expression of memory
of this cue. It is impossible to determine how proximal and
distal cues affected performance in the present study as they
were not manipulated.
Rovee-Collier (1990) makes three major points about
context effects on retrieval. First, infants do not encode
context wholistically. They are, however, sensitive to the
setting in which the training (or original event) occurs.
Second, components of the training (or original) context are
not functionally equal in cuing retrieval. Third, no single
critical element of context is essential for retrieval.
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However, more contextual support is needed to reactivate a
memory once it has become wholly inaccessible.
Applying Rovee-Collier
' s view then, one would expect that
the radical changes we made in the physical context would
indeed impact memory severely. Few components of the original
context were provided. Those that were provided were not
necessarily the most salient to the children, as evidenced
from the verbal reports regarding the light, which indicate
the potential inequality of cues. Since so little contextual
support was available, one could argue that the memory had not
become totally inaccessible. For if it had, no memory at all
would have been retrieved with such contextual changes.
As indicated, changes in context relating to changes in
the task demands also are likely to have contributed to
performance. Children in the present study were purposely
asked to remember many items and activities unrelated to the
target event and were tested on these through direct
questioning many times throughout the session realistically
interweaving new activities with old. It would not be
surprising for the additional demands, not related to the
target event, to have interfered with memory. Interference
effects have been found to impair memory for original
experiences in studies using memory for lists (Howe, 1993,
March) . In fact, Brainerd (in press) offers a hypothesis that
the development of recall is governed chiefly by age changes
in basic processes, especially changes in production and
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sensitivity to different forms of interference. Studies by
Brainerd and Reyna (1990) indicated that the susceptibility to
interference declines from birth to adulthood.
Howe and Brainerd (1989) have provided a model of long-
term retention which they call the trace integrity model.
Their description in many ways is consistent with Rovee-
Collier's approach although they conceptualize the processes
of storage and retrieval in slightly different terms and
emphasis. They see retrieval and storage not as dichotomous
entities but rather as aspects of a single continuous memory
factor which they call trace integrity. Trace retention is a
matter of memory strength which is determined by trace
integrity. The integrity of a trace may be affected by
restorage. That is, a child may fail to store elements of an
experience on one occasion, but encode them on another so that
storage failures are not necessarily permanent. This was
definitely seen in the results of the present study.
Performance at 60 months of age was not predicted by
performance on earlier tests either at 14- or at 32-months of
age. Children who looked at 14-months as if they "forgot"
were able to provide verbal recall at 60 months. Brainerd et
al. 's (1990) results with 7-70 year olds found that forgetting
at all ages is more apt to be due to an aspect of storage
failure rather than retrieval failure.
Combining the trace integrity model with elements of
fuzzy-trace theory discussed above, Brainerd and his
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colleagues claim that traces held in storage for a long time
are reduced to gist and can be restored by reconstructive
processing. It is the presence of gist which makes traces
durable. Certainly the performance of the experienced
children in the present study can be viewed as illustrating
memory for gist of the target event many years later.
It seems important to emphasize that despite the messages
of these theoretical approaches that changes in context may
seriously affect memory performance, and a wealth of
supporting data in the literature, in the present study the
radical changes made in context did not eradicate memory.
Experienced children were able to demonstrate memory for
earlier event (s) despite major changes in physical context and
task demands. One can only speculate how much more memory
would have been expressed had such contextual changes not been
instituted.
Effect of Experience Level
Performance was not dependent solely upon the number of
prior experiences. The group of children with multiple
experiences at 10 months who were tested at 14 months and who
also participated in the 32-month follow-up and, thus had the
most experience of all groups, did not demonstrate the highest
level of memory. In fact, children with only one previous
experience whether it was at 14 months or 32 months of age
performed better and those children who had two experiences
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(at 14 and 32 months) performed equivalently
. The highest
level of overall memory was demonstrated by the children with
multiple experiences at 10 months who were then tested at 14
months but did not participate in the 32-month follow-up.
We have previously discussed the influence of contextual
change on memory expression. Context becomes important as
well in relation to effects of multiple experiences. Multiple
experiences helped children whose experiences were of more or
less the same event. At 10 and 14 months for instance, the
infants' experience was most similar. And it appears that the
most repeated similar experience established the most durable
representations or memory. This is consistent with Hudson and
Sheffield (1993, March) who recently reported that 18-month-
olds who re-experienced an event 2 weeks after the original
experience remembered more activities 8-10 weeks later than
those children without a second experience. However, if the
multiple experiences were in vastly different events, such as
10 and 14 months versus 32 months, memory was negatively
impacted
.
Thus, children with more experience did not necessarily
perform better. The age at the time of initial experience did
not appear to be a critical factor either. Both groups of
children with one prior experience performed equivalently
regardless of whether this experience was at 14 months or 32
months of age. This is particularly interesting because not
only was the one group younger at the time, but the experience
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was more remote. An additional 18 months had elapsed between
first and second tests.
These results are consistent with Mandler's deferred
imitation results (1990b) with 16- and 20-month-old children.
She concluded that repeated experience with an event is not a
necessary requirement for an accessible representation to be
formed. This is also the same conclusion reached by Perris et
al. (1990) who found memory for a single event experienced at
6.5 months of age 1 to 2 years later.
As discussed earlier, Hudson and Nelson (1986) found that
both familiarity and meaningfulness of events had a strong
effect on general and episodic representations. They found
that after one experience, preschool children's recall was
very episodic. In at least one minor respect, our results are
consistent. If we consider latency to first successful target
response as the best indicator of specific knowledge about the
target toy, we find that subjects with a single experience at
14 or 32 months were faster than those children with more
experience, suggesting use of an episodic representation. It
might be argued that the detailed accounts provided by some
children with multiple experiences in infancy who did not
return at 32 months are inconsistent with this interpretation.
However, from Hudson and Nelson's perspective one could say
that the event was meaningful for these children, and thus
enabled specific recall.
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Relevance of Results to Theories of Early Memory
Five-year-old children in the present study demonstrated
that they could remember events that they last experienced 28
to 46 months previously. Some of them even talked about it.
Thus, infants and young children are capable of encoding
events at the time of experience so that long-term retrieval
is possible, and they are capable of verbally recalling
elements of an event that occurred when they were preverbal.
Such results are consistent with Mandler's view that infants
are capable of forming representations that can be accessed
later.
These results do not support Nelson's claims that lack of
linguistic capabilities and social skills at the time of
encoding prevent establishment of long-term specific memories
by children. They seem at least compatible, however, with her
argument that significance to the self system is necessary for
later retrieval. The events were most likely differentially
meaningful to the children and consequently influenced their
encoding. If it were possible to determine meaningfulness at
the time of encoding, such a premise could be tested.
Howe and Courage's position that a sense of self must be
formed in order to recall early events cannot be disproved
either, as we did not have information on this for the
participating children. However, some doubt can be cast. Two
children gave free verbal recall without prompting. These
memories were not just motor elements of the learned toy
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contingency but indicated awareness of an interesting
attribute of an earlier place and time. These exceptional
children may have had a developed self
-concept at 14 months of
age, but it is unlikely.
Conclusions
Overall, results of the present study provide evidence
for four conclusions regarding early memory. First, as Spear
(1984) advocated, memory can be expressed in a number of
different ways and, therefore, must be measured by a variety
of behaviors. If we had attempted to determine the extent of
children's memories using only one or two measures such as
verbal recall or number of successful responses, we would have
reached the incorrect conclusion that children at 5 years of
age do not have any memory of events experienced 2 to 4 years
previously. The use of multiple behaviors and a cumulative
index in this study provided a more correct, although not
necessarily complete, memory assessment.
Second, "memory failure" at any one time may be due to
ineffective retrieval cues and have little connection to the
strength of the overall memory. The manner in which one asks
questions affects the answers one gets. For example, the fact
that subjects in the present study were probed for recognition
of their target toy (a modified stuffed animal) only after
being introduced to three other stuffed animals during an
immediately preceding structured play segment, may well have
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promoted interference. Mandler (1990b) makes a similar point,
expressing her concern on how instructions (self-imposed or
external) affect behavior.
Third, only aspects of the event that are attended to or
noticed can be encoded, and aspects of a target event that a
researcher believes important are not necessarily noticed by
or of interest to the child. Thus, an inability to recall or
recognize such elements may not be evident of a retrieval
failure since no memory may have been formed in the first
place. An example from this study was the inability of
subjects to recognize photographs of the experimenters.
Rovee-Collier has repeatedly suggested that the experimenter
is an important part of the event, and we originally expected
that the person leading the experience would be important to
the representation of it. However, the children really did
not focus on the face of the experimenter; their attention was
directed elsewhere most of the time.
Fourth, just because no evidence for memory exists at one
particular time, does not mean that the event was never
originally encoded nor that the memory no longer exists. In
this same vein, performance at time A does not necessarily
predict performance at time B (especially if there are
differences in focus and demands of the events) . We were
struck time and time again with the tremendous variability in
individual performance at different points in development. A
perfect example of this is the child who at 14 months of age
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could be classified as displaying no memory (as he made no
successful responses at all), but who was able to provide a
verbal account of some elements of the experience in infancy
almost 4 years later! Performance at any one time reflected
not only knowledge from the past, but interest, motivation to
achieve or comply, temperament, and social skills. We noted
not only a lack of correlation in memory abilities but real
deviations on these other dimensions at different ages.
Finally, a caveat. The enterprise of memory research is
a difficult one. However, we must not let its difficult and
at times imprecise nature dissuade us from continuing. The
more information and knowledge we are able to attain, the
better our prospects of achieving a true understanding of the
nature of children's memory. As is apparent from the present
study, young children can remember aspects of events for guite
a long time. And children can tell us a lot about what they
remember and know as long as we are willing and open to
"listening" to them no matter what the channels through which
they communicate.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM
Consent Form for Participants in Study of Early Memory (#6)Researchers: Nancy A. Myers and Cindy J. Speaker
In our current study we are presenting several small play
events to children between 4 and 6 years of age and then
asking for their memory of these activities and others they
may have experienced in the past. As you can see, we have
established three distinctive play locations in this room.
Your child will visit each in turn with the experimenter, and
play a quick "game" there. They will then move to the center
table where your child will be asked to recognize and recall
objects and pictures, and the events they have just
experienced. You may observe throughout the session, which
lasts about 30 minutes. It will also be recorded by a second
experimenter and on audiotape.
There is no danger or discomfort to your child and you
may stop the session at any time. There are no direct benefits
to your child; however, the results of this study will
increase our knowledge of early memory. All records are kept
confidential and, in analyzing data, children are identified
by number rather than name. Participation in this research is
voluntary and there is no penalty of any sort for not
participating. This project has been reviewed and approved by
the University of Massachusetts Human Subjects Committee.
Now that you have read the description above, please ask
us any further questions that occur to you about any aspect of
the procedure, and when we answer them to your satisfaction,
please sign the following statement:
"I have been informed of the procedures of this study,
have had questions answered to my satisfaction, and believe I
understand the experiment. I am further aware that my child
is free to stop and that I am free to withdraw my permission
at any subsequent time without prejudice to me or my child."
Parent's Signature
Child's Full Name Child's Date of Birth
Date
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF ITEMS
List of items for use during structured play segment:
Playhouse
Tanner the Bear
flower
pot (soil)
stove
braided rug
sofa
telephone
Igloo
Buttons the Monkey
styrofoam "snow" balls
scarf (hat/arms)
mittens
sled
skis
fur rug
Tent
Perky the Frog
fishing pole
fish
sleeping bag
outdoor grill
pocket knife
row boat
Non-specific
blanket
crackers
red plastic cup
jeans
hand saw
baby bottle
(Items in parens are not named but are present in order to
complete the activity.)
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APPENDIX C
SUBJECT ASSIGNMENT SHEET
S# /GROUP ORDER NON-SPECIFTC TARGET TARGET ORDER
house/ igloo/tent house
house/ igloo/tent igloo
house/igloo/tent tent
igloo/tent/house house
igloo/tent/house igloo
igloo/tent/house tent
tent/house/ igloo house
tent/house/ igloo igloo
tent/house/ igloo tent
house/tent/ igloo house
house/tent/ igloo igloo
house/tent/ igloo tent
igloo/house/tent house
igloo/house/tent igloo
igloo/house/tent tent
tent/ igloo/house house
tent/ igloo/house igloo
tent/igloo/house tent
************************************************************
house/igloo/tent house
house/ igloo/tent igloo
house/igloo/tent tent
igloo/tent/house house
igloo/tent/house igloo
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S# /GROUP ORDER NON-SPECIFTC TARGET TARGET ORDER
igloo/tent/house tent
tent/house/ igloo house
tent/house/ igloo igloo
tent/house/ igloo tent
house/tent/ igloo house
house/tent/ igloo igloo
house/tent/ igloo tent
igloo/house/tent house
igloo/house/tent igloo
igloo/house/tent tent
tent/igloo/house house
tent/igloo/house igloo
tent/ igloo/house tent
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APPENDIX D
SESSION SHEET
EMEM #6 SESSION SHEET
(revised 8/18/92)
Test Date Date of Birth
Subject Name # Group
FREE PLAY :
Toys played with: (circle all appropriate)
big airplane stove plate blocks
people skillet spoon bunny
small airplane bowl teacup
Locations entered: (note order, tally # times, and note
activities)
igloo
playhouse
tent
Comments
:
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STRUCTURED PLAY: Non-specific assignment:
Locations and items:
lst 2nd 3rd
!• 1.
.
1.
2
- 2. 2.
3- 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
7. 7. 7.
8 • 8 • 8 •
9. 9. 9.
10. 10. 10
11. 11. 11
12. 12. 12
Recall
:
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6.
.
6.
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OBJECT RECOGNITION TASK :
Circle yes or no.
Freddy the Fox Yes No
Gordy the Gorilla Yes No
Little girl insert Yes No
Beaded insert Yes No
Amoeba Yes No
Glitter fabric Yes No
Porcupine Yes No
Polar bear Yes No
Eve Yes No
Jacqui Yes No
Laura Yes No
Ramona Yes No
Comments
:
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GUESSING GAME ABOUT TOYS :
Non-Target
1. What's in bag?
2 . Name?
3. Seen before?
4 . Know what he does?
5. Interaction time until first response
6. Time from first response to stop
7 . Number of responses
Comments
:
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GUESSING GAME ABOUT TOYS :
Target
1. What's in bag?
2 . Name?
3. Seen before?
4 . Know what he does?
5. Interaction time until first response
6. Time from first response to stop
7 . Number of responses
Comments
:
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Intermediate Memory Task — Igloo
What did we do? (open-ended)
What did we make? (activity)
Who did we play with? (animal)
What toys did we take out of the box? (toys)
Comments
:
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Intermediate Memory Task — Playhouse
What did we do? (open-ended)
What activity did we do together? (activity)
Who did we play with? (animal)
What toys did we take out of the box? (toys)
Comments
:
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Intermediate Memory Task — Tent
What did we do? (open-ended)
What activity did we do together? (activity)
Who did we play with? (animal)
What toys did we take out of the box? (toys)
Comments
:
107
Video
Watch: Yes No
Look: continuous
almost continuous
frequently
occasionally
never
Cumulative look time:
Other behaviors:
Recommendation
Toy
Place
COMMENTS
:
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